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Federal Class Action Reform: A
Response to the Proposed
Legislation
By GEORGE B. MICKUM, III*
and
CAROL A. RHEES**
INTRODUCTION
Why write of potential reforms in federal class actions in
this issue of the Kentucky Law Journal dedicated to Former
Justice Stanley F. Reed? Although much could be written
about the Justice's contributions to the legacy of the Supreme
Court during his tenure there, or even during the period one
of us clerked for him, much of that ground has already been
plowed. More importantly, were he alive, Justice Reed, who
had a fascination with all aspects of the law, would be in-
tensely interested in this subject.
In many decisions,1 including some by the United States
Supreme Court, the federal courts have not been receptive to
class actions brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3).2 Moreover, the class action mechanism has not
* Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C. LL.B. Georgetown University.
Law Clerk for Justice Stanley F. Reed, 1953-54. Past Chairman and Co-Chairman of
the American Bar Association Section of Litigation's Committee on Class Actions and
Derivative Suits; present Chairman of committee recently formed by the Section of
Litigation to draft class action reform legislation. The views of the authors should not
be taken to represent the views of the American Bar Association, its Section of Liti-
gation or the Committee on Class Actions and Derivative Suits.
** Associate, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C. J.D. University of Virginia
Law School
I E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
2 Rule 23(b)(3) states:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to
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proven to be an effective mechanism for redressing mass, low-
level injuries. These factors, along with the proliferation of
consumer and employee-oriented federal statutes, have cre-
ated pressures to enhance the manageability of class actions
and to address other related problems. One such proposal
before the 97th Congress is House Bill 13.3
In an apparent response to campaign promises and other
statements of intent made by President Carter,4 the Office of
Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the Depart-
ment of Justice undertook a comprehensive reform of current
federal class action procedures. In December of 1977, copies of
a draft statute were widely circulated for review. A premise
underlying the proposal was that two kinds of cases are typi-
cally handled by class damage actions: those involving wide-
spread harm to individuals in amounts so small that litigation
costs prevent the bringing of individual suits or class actions
and those involving substantial economic injuries to individu-
als so numerous that permissive joinder is impracticable and
the maintenance of a class action is likely to achieve econo-
mies in the administration of justice. Recognizing this pre-
mise, the Department of Justice based its proposal on three
major conclusions. First, more must be done to deter in-
the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
conrolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
' H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This bill was introduced previously as
H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) and S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). The
proposal is hereinafter referred to as the "Justice Department proposal" or the "bill."
The bill actually emanated from the Office for Improvements in the Administration
of Justice ("OIAJ") within the Department of Justice. Although there is no indication
of the Department's current position on the proposal, Griffin Bell testified in support
of S. 3475 while Attorney General. Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Class Action Hearings].
" See 4 Class Action Rep. 491, 499, 588 (1975); OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BILL COMMEN-
TARY: THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE REVISION OF FEDERAL CLASS DAMAGE PROCEDURE
4 (July 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as BILL COMMENTARY].
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stances of pervasive small injury in which it is not economi-
cally feasible for the injured individuals to initiate actions.
Second, where individual injury is more substantial, effective
means of compensatory redress should be provided under pro-
cedures that avoid unnecessary escalation of expenses. Third,
the courts must be given tools to manage both types of cases
effectively and to avoid the procedural morass attendant to
such litigation.
Underlying these conclusions was the fundamental pre-
mise that the class action mechanism was being underutilized.
Thus, in spite of the courts' obvious antipathy for class ac-
tions, the Department of Justice designed its proposal to in-
crease the number of class actions and to convert them in
some instances into means for penalizing wrongdoers who
might otherwise escape being brought to justice.
As a result of comments received, the Justice Department
proposal was revised extensively and introduced in the Senate
in 1977 as Senate Bill 3475.1 The Senate Judiciary Subcom-
mittee for Improvements in Judicial Machinery held hearings
on the bill.7 After the hearings, the bill was revised again and
incorporated into the Small Business Judicial Access Act of
1979.8 Hearings again were held, this time before the Subcom-
mittee on SBA and SBIC Authority and General Small Busi-
ness Problems of the House Small Business Committee, 9 and
the legislative session lapsed with no further action on the
bill. This bill was revived and introduced in the 97th Congress
as House Bill 13.10 Whether the proposal will be adopted dur-
ing this Congress is questionable, but even if this bill dies, it
is clear that the issue of class action reform will remain, and
future proposals may draw largely on the past work of the De-
partment of Justice. If passed, the bill will work significant
changes in class action procedures. Thus, the vital issue of
5 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 10-11.
6 S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
7 Senate Class Action Hearings, supra note 3.
8 H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
' Judicial Access/Court Costs: Hearings on H.R. 5103 and H.R. 6429 Before the
Subcomm. on SBA and SBIC Authority and General Small Business Problems,
House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
10 H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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class action reform warrants consideration of the bill's
features."'
I. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PROPOSAL
The primary purpose of the Justice Department's propo-
sal is to provide an effective means of deterring illegal conduct
causing widespread, low-level injury. According to the Depart-
ment, such injury goes largely unchallenged under the present
rules. 12 This purpose fundamentally departs from the philoso-
phy underlying Rule 23(b). To implement the deterrent phi-
losophy, the Justice Department proposes to replace Rule
23(b)(3) with two entirely new procedures: one aimed at ille-
gal conduct causing widespread, low-level injury (the "public
action") and the other aimed at illegal conduct causing more
substantial injury (the "class compensatory action"). Addi-
tionally, the proposal includes a variety of new judicial man-
agement techniques and procedures intended to render class
actions more efficient and effective. Procedures under Rules
23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) and 23.1 are left unchanged, since they have
presented significantly fewer problems than the Rule 23(b)(3)
procedures.1 3 The following description of the proposal refers
to the provisions of House Bill 13.
A. The Public Action
Under the bill's provisions, the United States Attorney
General or a private party (relator) may bring a public action
in the name of the United States against a person whose ille-
gal conduct in the manufacture, rental, distribution, purchase
or offer of realty, goods or services (including securities) gives
rise to a civil private damage action under a federal statute.
Thus, diversity jurisdiction will not exist in the federal courts
with respect to public actions. The public action may be
brought only when the conduct harms at least two hundred
1 See Comment, Manageability of Class Actions Under S. 3475: Congress Con-
fronts the Policy Choices Revealed in Rule 23(b)(3) Litigation, 68 Ky. L.J. 216 (1979-
80) for a summary of the salient features of the first Department of Justice proposal.
As indicated, the focus here is on the second Department of Justice proposal.
12 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 10.
13 Id. at 1.
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persons whose individual injuries do not exceed $300 and
whose combined injuries exceed $60,000. Additionally, all of
the injuries must arise out of the same transaction or occur-
rence, and the action must present a substantial common
question of law or fact.
14
A relator bringing a public action under this bill must
give notice to the United States. 5 The United States Attorney
General then may assume control of the action, may allow the
relator to prosecute the action in the name of the United
States, or may refer the action to an appropriate state attor-
ney general. The United States may also opt to file with the
court a written statement explaining why the public interest
would not be served by the action; if this option is exercised,
the court will dismiss the suit unless the relator demonstrates
that the public interest warrants continuing the action.16 -
If the United States assumes control of the action, the
Attorney General or the agency assuming control may allow
private counsel to participate. The government may also
choose to retain private counsel, who will be compensated by
the government on either an hourly or a contingent fee basis. 8
When the action is assumed by the government, the bill pro-
vides that a relator whom the court finds "measurably ad-
vanced the limitation of the action" will be reimbursed for his
expenses, including attorneys' fees, as soon as practicable af-
ter the assumption. If the action is not assumed and the re-
lator prevails in the action or settles the case, the defendant
must pay to the relator taxable costs and reasonable litigation
expenses, including attorneys' fees, as well as an incentive fee
of not more than $10,000.20 If the action is assumed and the
government wins or settles the case, the defendant must reim-
burse the government for costs and expenses.2'
The bill permits calculation of damages by any reason-
" H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 101, § 3001 (1981).
Id. at § 3002(a).
16 Id. at § 3002(b).
17 Id. at § 3002(c)(1)(B).
' Id. at § 3003(b)(1)(B).
Id. at § 3003(b)(1)(A).
20 Id. at § 3003(a).
21 Id. at § 3003(b)(2).
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able means and specifies that individual proof of damages
shall not be required.22 The recovery may be based upon ei-
ther the monetary benefit or profit realized by the defendant
from the illegal conduct or upon the total monetary damage to
the class members.2 3 If the substantive law underlying the ac-
tion provides for the award of a multiple of the damages or for
a limitation on aggregate liability, the defendant will be as-
sessed accordingly.2 4 In such cases, claim payments will be ad-
justed proportionately.
2 5
The bill establishes a "public recovery fund," to be super-
vised by either the court or by the director of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts. Upon receipt of a pub-
lic recovery, notice by publication or other reasonable means
shall be given to inform eligible persons of their right to file
claims. The court or director may use any reasonably accurate
distribution method that does not require the submission of
individual claims. The court may even determine that distri-
bution is not possible because of the difficulty of identifying
potential claimants. In any event, all claims must be paid
within one year of notice.2"
If the fund exceeds the amount necessary to pay class
members, the court will pay the excess to the United States
Treasury, which in turn will distribute the money either to
the state, to the Justice Department or agency conducting the
action or, if the action was conducted by a relator, to the
agency that could have initiated the action. This fund will be
used to pay private counsel retained by the United States and
to reimburse relators if the United States assumed the action.
The state, Justice Department or agency may use any amount
remaining after three years for the enforcement of any statute
within its purview.
27
22 Id. at § 3004(c)(2).
23 Id. at § 3004(b)(1).
24 Id. at § 3004(d).
2. Id. at § 3005(b).
20 Id.
217 Id. at § 3005(c).
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B. The Class Compensatory Action
A class compensatory action may be brought against a
person whose conduct gives rise to a civil private right of ac-
tion for damages under any federal statute. The conduct must
have caused injury to or created liabilities for at least forty
persons, each in an amount exceeding $300. Additionally, the
injuries or liabilities must arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence, and the action must present a substantial com-
mon question of law or fact.
28
A defendant found liable in such an action must: (1)
make a reasonable effort to identify from his records the per-
sons likely to have been injured in excess of $300 and the
amount of their injuries; (2) give individual notice of liability
to such persons; and (3) give notice reasonably calculated to
reach a substantial percentage of the remaining class.
2 9
C. Judicial Management of Public and Class Compensatory
Actions
In order to expedite and to improve the judicial manage-
ment of class actions, the bill adds a final subchapter of provi-
sions applicable to both public and class compensatory
actions.
Within thirty days after the commencement of a public
action or a class compensatory action, the court shall order a
preliminary hearing to occur within 120 days from commence-
ment of the action.30 "No motion, other than a discovery mo-
tion or motion seeking immediate injunctive relief, shall be
heard or disposed of prior to the preliminary hearing."3 1 In
order for the action to proceed, the court must find at or im-
mediately after the hearing that the action is reasonably likely
to meet the statutory prerequisites, 3 2 that it presents suffi-
ciently serious questions on the merits, and that the interests
28 Id. at § 3011.
29 Id. at § 3012(b).
8' Id. at § 3022(a)(1).
21 Id. at § 3022(a)(3).
22 Id. at § 3022(b). The action must meet either the requirements for a public
action in § 3001(a) or those for a class compensatory action in § 3011(a) before the
court will proceed with the action.
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of the United States or the class will be adequately repre-
sented by the relator or representative party and his counsel.3
If the action is not dismissed, the court shall enter an order
describing the scope of the action and shall include a descrip-
tion of the transaction or occurrence and the substantial com-
mon question."
The bill authorizes limited discovery prior to the prelimi-
nary hearing. Each side is limited to thirty interrogatories, to
the lesser of not more than ten deposition days or depositions
of not more than ten persons, and to requests for documents.
The bill prohibits discovery of unnamed injured persons both
before and after the preliminary hearing, unless a party makes
a showing of substantial need and undue hardship."'
At or immediately after the preliminary hearing in a class
compensatory action, the court shall determine whether some
injured persons will be excluded from the class or included in
the class if such persons so request. 6 The court shall then
give to all class members notice reasonably calculated to as-
sure adequacy of representation and fairness and shall include
a description of persons to be excluded from the action.3 7
The district court must notify the judicial panel on multi-
district litigation of the commencement of all public or class
compensatory actions. "[T]o the extent feasible and consis-
tent with the interests of justice," all actions arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence shall be consolidated for all
purposes in a single district court. 8
A judgment on the merits in a public action, unless other-
wise limited, is conclusive against the defendant, the class
members, the United States or any state suing on the class
33 Id.
Id. at § 3022(d).
" Id. at § 3021(a), (b).
36 Id. at § 3022(3)(1). In determining whether to exclude class members who
have not requested to be included, the court shall consider (1) whether the amount of
their injury or liability makes it feasible for them to pursue their interests separately
and (2) whether those persons have the necessary resources, experience, and sophisti-
cation in business to conduct their own litigation. Id. at § 3022(e)(1)(A) & (B).
11 Id. at 3022(e)(2).
Id. at § 3023(a)(emphasis added). For a similar provision, see Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
where parens patriae actions are consolidated for all purposes.
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members' behalf, and, if the action is not filed or assumed by
it, against the United States if it later sues on behalf of class
members.39 Similarly, a judgment on the merits in a class
compensatory action, unless otherwise limited, is conclusive
against the defendant and any injured person who remained
in or entered the class. °
The bill requires court approval for settlements. In a class
compensatory action, notice of a proposed settlement and
hearing must be given to class members. In a public action,
the United States also shall be notified and may participate in
the hearing.41
Liability and damage issues are to be tried separately, to
the extent constitutionally permitted. 2 In addition, a separate
fee hearing shall be held to assure the reasonableness of attor-
neys' fees awarded in public or class compensatory actions.4
As a further tool for judicial management, the bill provides
that the court may dismiss class compensatory or public ac-
tions it finds unmanageable."
Finally, the bill provides definitions and certain special
provisions with regard to seven substantive laws.45 It amends
Rule 23 by deleting subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(2) and the last
sentence of subdivision (c)(3) 4' and provides that any existing
', H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 101, § 3024(a) (1981).
Id. at § 3024(b).
4' Id. at § 3025.
42 Id. at § 3026(b).
" Id. at § 3026(c).
" Id. at § 3026(d). The court, however, must first permit amendment to the
complaint.
45 Id. at § 3027. The seven substantive laws specifically mentioned are the
Magnuson-Moss-Warranty-Federal Trade Commissson Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2310(d)(3), 2310(e) (1976) (provisions relating to cure of illegality, aggregate claims
and minimum individual harm); the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (limitation on aggregate liability); the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B) (Supp. I1 1979) (limitation on aggregate
liability); the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976) (limitation
on aggregate liability); the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (preserving right of state attorney general to bring
parens patriae action); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976) (con-
sent of unnamed party plaintiffs shall not be required); and the Deepwater Port Act
of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(i) (1976) (confirming right of relator to bring public action
under that act).
41 H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 102 (1981). The sentence deleted from
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right to secure damages under the provisions of Rule 23 "re-
maining in force" shall not be affected. 7
II. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED BILL
A. The Public Action
In order to assess accurately the Justice Department's re-
form proposal, the far-reaching impact of the new public ac-
tion concept must not be underestimated. Essentially, the
public action would convert a broad range of private rights
into a right on the part of the federal government. Upon initi-
ation of a public action by either the government or a private
party, other private parties whose injuries fall within the
range covered by the public action would lose all rights to pro-
ceed with their own causes of action and would be bound by
the judgment obtained in the public action, even though they
would have had no notice of its pendency nor any right to opt
out. In contrast to current procedures and to the proposed
class compensatory action, a statistically computed aggregate
class damage award would be assessed against defendants
having no right to recover any amounts not actually claimed
by class members. Moreover, prevailing plaintiffs in all public
actions would be entitled to have their attorneys' fees paid by
the defendant. In short, the public action would be trans-
formed in many instances from a private compensatory action
into a punitive action prosecuted in the name of the public
interest in an effort to deter certain types of unlawful
conduct.
1. Is the Public Action Needed?
Although dissatisfaction with various aspects of current
class action practice is widespread, no systematic analysis has
(c)(3) is:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was di-
rected and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to
be members of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
"I Id. at sec. 101, § 3027(g).
[Vol. 69
CLASS ACTION REFORM
demonstrated a need for the public action device with respect
to most, if not all, of the statutes covered by the Justice De-
partment proposal. Although the scope of the public action is
limited to "conduct in the manufacture, rental, distribution,
or sale of realty, goods or services, including securities," that
"gives rise to a civil private right of action for damages under
a statute of the United States, ' 48 this new action would en-
compass a wide variety of substantive federal statutes. 49 Obvi-
ously, the civil actions created by these statutes arise from a
variety of legal provisions, each with unique elements of proof
and each covering different factual and procedural situations.
Therefore, instead of the "shotgun" approach implemented in
the Justice Department's proposal, the special characteristics
and problems of a particular substantive area should be con-
sidered and a remedy tailored to that specific situation when
need for a public action in that area can be demonstrated.
Without such an area-by-area approach, the potential for con-
flicts and unintended results is great. °
Although the Justice Department's commentary on the
proposed bill frequently refers to the general need for major
reform in order to deal with situations of widespread, low-
level harm, the commentary contains only two specific refer-
48 Id. at § 3001 (a)(1).
49 Id. The Department of Justice has prepared an "illustrative" list of 67 statutes
that would be affected by the proposed public action. The statute covers a wide spec-
trum of substantive fields, including agriculture, banking, commerce, communica-
tions, conservation, copyright law, criminal law, customs duties, foreign relations, In-
dian law, judicial procedure, navigation, public contracts, public health, public lands,
railroads, shipping, transportation and veterans benefits. OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED REVISIONS IN
FEDERAL CLASS DAMAGE PROCEDURES 13 (Aug. 25, 1978) (bill commentary accompany-
ing S. 3475).
80 One example of an undesirable relationship between the public action and an
"illustrative statute" occurs with the recently enacted parens patriae provision of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Anntitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980). The bill, however, would in effect provide an easy method for circum-
vention of the limitations carefully devised by the drafters of the parens patriae pro-
visions. For example, the United States Attorney General could refer to a state attor-
ney general a public action involving business entities; the parens patriae provisions
purposely limit the applicability of the action to natural persons. Under the public
action, aggregation of damages would occur regardless of whether the violation in-
volved price fixing; the parens patriae provisions authorize aggregation only for price
fixing cases.
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ences to situations that might warrant a new form of ac-
tion-cases involving consumer fraud and cases involving
price fixing and other antitrust violations.51 Even in those ar-
eas, the figures used by the Department of Justice to demon-
strate the need for reform are grossly overstated.5 2 Recent
federal legislation has specifically addressed problems in these
substantive areas, with the issue of widespread, low-level in-
jury receiving particular attention.53 While recognizing the ex-
istence of these statutes, the commentary asserts that their
coverage is not sufficiently broad.5 4 The drafters of the bill,
however, have failed to recognize that the "limited impact" of
these laws was precisely what Congress, after review of all rel-
evant factors, determined was needed. Moreover, the com-
mentators do not explain why broadening these statutes or
drafting new statutes to meet particular, well-defined deficien-
cies would not be an appropriate response to the specific con-
cern alleged.
2. Procedural Aspects of the Public Action
The public action includes a variety of procedural modifi-
cations and innovations designed to render actions more man-
ageable and effective. Such modifications, however, would
eliminate a number of the procedural safeguards currently es-
51 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 18.
52 Philip A. Lacovara, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on behalf of
The Business Roundtable and the National Association of Manufacturers, noted that
the supposedly conservative figure of $150 billion cited as the cost of consumer anti-
trust injuries alone is more than twice the total amount of all corporate profits earned
by domestic manufacturers in 1977. Similarly, the $21 billion figure cited as the cost
of consumer fraud was apparently derived from a 1974 U.S. Chamber of Commerce
publication entitled A Handbook on White Collar Crime. According to that publica-
tion, the single largest component in the figure cited was $12 billion in lost govern-
ment revenue resulting from tax fraud. The estimate of the cost to consumers of ille-
gal activities was only $5.5 billion. Senate Class Action Hearings, supra note 3, at
107.
'" See, e.g., the Magnuson-Moss-Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d), (3) (1976); the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
51 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 19-22; see also Berry, Ending Substance's
Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class
Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 321-22 (1980).
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tablished for class actions by Rule 23. The drafters of the bill
contend that the elimination of some procedural safeguards is
permissible because the public action is designed primarily to
deter unlawful conduct and penalize wrongdoers, rather than
to compensate injured individuals.55 This rationale, however,
ignores the fact that the public action, like the class compen-
satory action or any other class action, has an explicit com-
pensatory purpose.5 6 Moreover, the extent of a particular ac-
tion's concern for deterrence, disgorgement and compensation
cannot be judged absent an examination of the purposes un-
derlying the substantive statute.
If viewed primarily as a deterrent piece of legislation, it is
significant that the public action lacks the additional safe-
guards commonly found in civil penalty actions. For example,
defendants are liable for more than clearly illegal conduct.
They are afforded no opportunity to cure illegal conduct, and
no exception is made for good faith violations. Factors such as
the frequency and persistence of violations and the extent to
which the conduct is intentional are not considered in assess-
ing damages, and, with the exception of the recognized ceil-
ings already included in the underlying substantive statutes,
the defendant's liability is not limited.5 7 Thus, the bill not
only eliminates a number of the procedural safeguards consid-
ered appropriate in a primarily compensatory action, but it
also fails to provide the safeguards common to deterrent or
punitive actions. The provisions or purposes of the underlying
substantive laws are not considered.""
The drafters of the bill also rely on the supervision and
BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 13-14, 41-42.
50 The bill gives class members a statutory right to compensation for their inju-
ries. The public action bars them from initiating their own action.
' As noted by the American College of Trial Lawyers, "[a] flagrant violation
may cause little mass economic injury while business decisions taken in good faith,
e.g., after consultation with independent counsel and in accord with then-existing de-
cisions of the courts, may later be held to violate the ... laws and to have resulted in
a substantial mass economic effect." AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, COM-
MENTS WITH RESPECT TO A PROPOSED BILL ENTITLED "EFFECTIVE PROCEDURAL REME-
DIES FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT CAUSING MASS ECONOMIC INJURY," DATED DECEMBER 1,
1977, AND PREPARED BY THE OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 6 (1978).
'1 See note 50 supra and accompanying text for such an observation.
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involvement of the federal government to justify the elimina-
tion of procedural standards. For example, if a private indi-
vidual initiates a public action, the United States can recom-
mend dismissal upon a determination that the action is not in
the "public interest." Federal or state officials can also choose
to assume control or to support the maintenance of a public
action, and the United States can participate in settlement
hearings. Although the Department of Justice has estimated
that the federal government would only handle approximately
twenty-two public actions per year,5 9 a far more substantial
number of actions would probably be initiated, necessitating
review and continuing supervision. The federal government
would have to establish a costly new bureaucracy within the
Department of Justice to supervise these public actions and
after it was established, the bureaucracy's ability to assess
thoroughly and fairly all of the public actions referred to it is
open to serious doubt.
With this backdrop in mind, attention will be focused pri-
marily on four significant procedural difficulties with the pub-
lic action: the lack of notice to class members, despite the res
judicata effect of the public action; the calculation of the pub-
lic recovery and the distribution of claims; the incentive fee;
and the potential for duplicative suits.
a. Lack of Notice and Res Judicata
The proposed bill makes no provision in the public action
for prejudgment notice, and members of the affected class
have no right to opt out of the proceeding. Despite these limi-
tations, the judgment in a public action would be conclusive
as to any injured individual in the class whose damages do not
exceed $300.
Although the requirement of early individual notice
found in current Rule 23(c)(2)60 may have delayed some ac-
tions and in some cases may have even rendered them too ex-
" BrIL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 33.
60 Rule 23(c)(2) requires "the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort." FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c)(2).
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pensive to pursue, the constitutionality of entirely eliminating
notice is questionable. Precedent exists for the proposition
that a person whose interests are being litigated in a proceed-
ing to which he is not a party is, in some circumstances, con-
stitutionally entitled to notice and to the concomitant oppor-
tunity to decide not only whether he wants his claim pursued
at all but whether he wants it pursued in that suit or in some
other action of his choosing. In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Co., 1 for example, the United States Su-
preme Court held that "[a]n elementary and fundamental re-
quirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be ac-
corded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."62 Similarly, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,6" the
Supreme Court stated that "notice and an opportunity to be
heard [are] fundamental requisites of the constitutional guar-
antee of procedural due process. ' ' " Since the Court did not
have to reach the purely constitutional issue in Eisen, 5 the
extent to which the Court based its holding on due process
requirements is unclear. Nevertheless, the proposition that
notice, in some instances, is constitutionally required is
strongly supported.
The Department of Justice, however, in a memorandum
on the constitutionality of various aspects of the public action,
has cited a number of cases standing for the proposition that
notice is not constitutionally required. The department has
concluded that "due process requires only [that] class mem-
bers whom the judgment is to bind to be adequately repre-
sented by the named plaintiffs and their attorneys .... 66
All of the cases relied upon by the department, 7 however,
61 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
82 Id. at 314.
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Id. at 174.
" The Court did not have to reach the constitutional question because the rule
itself required notice.
"0 OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDA ON CONSTITU-
TIONALITY, APPENDIX C at 4 [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDA ON CONSTITUTIONALITY].
6 Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977); Elliott v.
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dealt with class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2),
rather than under Rule 23(b)(3) where individual interests are
more likely to vary. 8 Indeed, in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual In-
surance Co., 9 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
observed:
The very nature of a (b)(2) [or (b)(1)] class is that it is
homogeneous without any conflicting interest between the
members of the class .... Thus, as long as the representa-
tion is adequate and faithful, there is no unfairness in giving
res judicata effect to a judgment against all members of the
class even if they have not received notice. 0
The court, however, distinguished class actions brought under
Rule 23(b)(3): "[M]andatory notice is required in (b)(3) ac-
tions for the effective operation of the 'opt-out' provision,
which is essential to protect the interests of individuals in the
heterogeneous group. The 'opt-out' procedure, however, is not
necessary for the protection of interests of individuals in the
homogeneous (b)(2) class." 1
Moreover, the cases cited by the Justice Department do
not hold that notice is never required by due process. Rather,
each of the cases specifically noted that Rule 23(d)(2) gives
the court discretion to require notice even in (b)(1) and (b)(2)
actions, and each noted that there may be circumstances in
which notice to absent class members is necessary for the fair
conduct of the action.
7 2
Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977); Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167
(D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
"' The drafters of Rule 23 recognized this distinction between Rule 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) class actions, on the one hand and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, on the other,
when they provided discretionary notice for the former actions and mandatory notice
and opt-out procedures for the latter. The Rule 23 Advisory Committee's Note ex-
plains that when a class is maintained under subdivision (b)(3), "this individual in-
terest is respected. Thus the Court is required to direct notice to the members of the
class of the right of each member to be excluded from the class upon his request." 39
F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966).
so 508 F.2d at 239.
70 Id. at 256.
71 Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
" Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d at 1374; Elliott v. Weinberger, 564
F.2d 1228-29; Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd,
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Even if adequate representation of the class were a con-
stitutional substitute for notice,"1 it is unclear that the bill
would always insure fully adequate representation. To insure
adequate representation, the drafters place substantial reli-
ance upon governmental involvement and supervision of pub-
lic actions.74 But the protection afforded by federal supervi-
sion may be illusory when one considers the potentially large
number of public actions that may be initiated each year. In
addition, the bill's drafters rely upon the inquiries the court is
required to make as to the legal competence of the relator's
counsel for assurance of adequate representation.7 5 This pro-
vision adds no new protection as courts already are required
to examine the qualifications of attorneys under present Rule
23.76
In view of the elimination of notice and opt-out require-
ments, the bill's attempt to extend the res judicata effect of a
judgment in a public action to all class members with individ-
ual claims not in excess of $300 is also constitutionally sus-
pect. In its memorandum on the bill's constitutionality, the
Department of Justice recognized the existence of the consti-
tutional issue 77 and acknowledged that even if the res judicata
431 U.S. 864 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256-57 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
73 Rule 23 Advisory Committee's Note states that notice must be given in an
attempt "to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action procedure is
of course subject." 39 F.R.D. 98, 107 (1966).
The Justice Department's belief that adequate representation is a sufficient sub-
stitute for notice is not well grounded. Courts have held under present Rule 23 and
under the previous version of that rule that the mere predominance of common ques-
tions of law or fact is not sufficient justification for binding absent class members
unless those members receive notice and have the choice of opting out. Thus, it is the
right not to particupate, i.e., to opt out, or to participate on their own behalves that
safeguards the interests of the absent class members. Mere adequacy of representa-
tion is not enough.
74 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 38. The commentary also cites the incen-
tive fee as advancing adequacy of representation, claiming that it will encourage "de-
tection of violations and close citizen cooperation in public action litigation." Id. at
38-39. See text accompanying notes 82-83 infra for a discussion of the incentive fee
resulting in the opposite effect.
71 Id. at 38.
7' See Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969).
77 As stated by the Justice Department:
Research into the potential constitutional problem outlined above has re-
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effect were upheld in principle, "adequate representation in
each particular case in which an injured person seeks to avoid
the res judicata effect of a judgment would be a fact question
which would have to be determined after the event.
'1 8
b. Calculation of Recovery and Distribution of Claims
In order to maximize the deterrent effect of the public
action, the defendant's liability is either the full amount of
the profits realized from the illegal conduct or the aggregate
value of all damages inflicted on class members, regardless of
the amount actually distributed to the injured parties. The
bill does not require class members to prove individual injury.
In many cases, particularly where the affected class has suf-
fered only de minimus injuries, it is probable that only a rela-
tively small portion of the recovery actually would be distrib-
uted to the injured parties. 9 Amounts not claimed and
distributed would "escheat" to the government (including, po-
tentially, a state government) and could be used to pay ex-
penses involved in unrelated public actions or to enforce stat-
utes within the government's purview. Thus, the bill imports
the device of "fluid recovery" into the public action.
Undoubtedly, separate proof of individual injury cannot
be dispensed with completely in all of the different kinds of
civil actions to which the public action device would apply. On
vealed no precedent upon which a reliable prediction concerning the res
judicata effects of a public action judgment can be based. On the one hand,
to give the judgment res judicata effect would seem to fly in the face of the
traditional rule that a judgment may not bind one who was not a party or
in privity with a party to the suit in which it was entered and who was
given no opportunity to be heard. E.g., Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065,
1070-72 (1st Cir. 1978). On the other hand, the legislation should, in normal
circumstances, insure that the de minimis (as a practical matter) interests
of injured persons are adequately represented, even though the action in
which their interests are being protected is one prosecuted on behalf of the
United States.
MEMORANDA ON CONSTITUTIONALITY, supra note 66, at 7.
71 Id. at 8 n.7.
79 Indeed, if the court orthe Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts determines that it is impracticable to determine accurately the identi-
ties of the injured persons or the amounts of individual damages, it can order that no
damages be distributed. H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 101, § 3005(b).
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the contrary, individual computation of damages may fre-
quently be necessary because the underlying substantive stat-
ute so requires"0 or simply because other means of calculating
damages are not feasible.
Moreover, the fedeal courts have rejected the concepts of
aggregate class damage assessment and fluid recovery in the
class action setting, in part on constitutional grounds.8 ' For
example, in the Second Circuit's Eisen opinion, Judge Medina
stated:
Even if amended Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any
such fantastic procedure, the courts would have to reject it
as an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due
process of law .... We hold the "fluid recovery" concept
and practice to be illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the
manageability problems of class actions and wholly
improper.
82
Even if, as some commentators have claimed,8 3 there is no
constitutional obstacle to aggregate calculation of damages
and fluid recovery, an across-the-board application of such
80 Senate Class Action Hearings, supra note 3, at 110-111, 131-32; Develop-
ments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1524, 1526 (1976). See
National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 376 F. Supp. 620, 634-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 5-12 (1972).
" See, e.g., In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417
U.S. 156 (1974). See also Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.
1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976); Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.,
508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); State of California v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). But see
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (permitting fluid recovery in a
settlement).
Although Congress specifically authorized fluid recovery in the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15(e) (1976), the constitu-
tionality of the provision was seriously disputed during the debates on the bill and
has not yet been tested in the courts. In any case, the Hart-Scott-Rodino bill applies
fluid recovery only to parens patriae actions brought by a state attorney general on
behalf of the citizens of his state for price fixing violations.
82 479 F.2d at 1018.
"' See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 80, at 1524 n.359
and authorities cited therein.
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mechanisms may be inappropriate. Instead, as the Harvard
Law Review concluded in its overview of class actions, "the
process of determining appropriate methods for delivering
damages in class actions should proceed by analyzing whether
the policies served by particular mechanisms for calculating
and distributing damages match statutory policies." 4 Thus,
the drafters of the bill again have failed adequately to con-
sider the varying goals, policies and provisions of the many
substantive statutes affected by the public action proposal.
c. Incentive Fee
In an effort to "encourage action by injured persons,
those best able to detect violations," and to "create incentives
that run not only to attorneys,"' 5 the bill provides for an in-
centive fee to be paid to the relator in the event of a success-
ful public action or settlement. The fee would equal twenty
percent of the first $25,000 of recovery plus ten percent of the
next $50,000. Thus, a settlement of only $75,000 would guar-
antee the class representative the maximum incentive fee. To
the extent that the fee provision is intended to encourage the
relator to monitor the performance of his counsel to ensure an
adequate recovery, it is unlikely to achieve its purpose. In-
deed, when coupled with the strong incentive defendants have
to settle,88 the incentive fee could possibly create an undesir-
able settlement dynamic.87
Although the incentive fee concept may have some utility,
its usefulness should not be overestimated. Although citizen
detection may work well in some cases, laymen often may be
unable to perceive mass harms, such as price fixing or securi-
ties fraud, or to recognize that a legal cause of action exists.8
84 Id. at 1527.
" BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 40.
88 In view of the costs of litigating, the fear of adverse publicity and the potential
liability that may accompany many suits, defendants would have strong incentive to
settle even utterly frivolous suits, particularly since the settlement would bind absent
class members.
87 Although the court and potentially the United States would participate in the
settlement conference, it cannot be safety assumed that these limited safeguards
could effectively balance and regulate the settlement process in all cases.
8 5 Class Action Rep. 110 (1979).
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In any event, if the incentive fee concept is to be utilized, it
should be restructured to become a more balanced settlement
device."9
d. The Potential for Duplicative Lawsuits and Recovery
The public action/class compensatory action dichotomy
proposed by the bill would virtually guarantee that as often as
not two separate class claims arising from the same transac-
tion or occurrence and presenting substantially common ques-
tions will be litigated in federal court. The potential for dupli-
cative state court proceedings is equally great. The bill
increases the possibility of overlapping state actions by pro-
viding that federal court jurisidiction over public actions shall
not extend to pendent claims based on state law.90 Although
duplicative suits in federal court can be consolidated, the bill
offers no guidance as to the effect of a federal court action.
Thus, the public action/class compensatory action dichotomy
would appear to reduce rather than to increase efficiency in
disposing of related claims.
B. The Class Compensatory Action
1. Class Compensatory Action Prerequisites
The bill would reduce the prerequisites for maintaining a
class action for damages to three: (1) that at least forty per-
sons suffer injuries exceeding $300 or have liabilities exceed-
ing $300; (2) that the injuries or liabilities arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or oc-
currences; and (3) that there be at least one substantial ques-
tion of law or fact common to the proposed class. In addition,
the bill directs the court to assess whether the named plain-
89 For example, one commentator has suggested that a "sliding scale" fee be sub-
stituted so that a relator would always receive more for a larger class recovery. Id. at
111.
" In addition, as a result of a gap in the law, there may be cases that do not
satisfy the statutory prerequisites of either the public action or class compensatory
action that would have to be brought in state court. For example, a class action where
the class numbered less than 200 with individual claims less than $300 or aggregage
injury less than $60,000, or where the class numbered less than 40 with individual
claims in excess of $300 could only be brought in state court.
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tiffs and their counsel will adequately protect the interests of
all class members.
The radical changes found in the proposed class compen-
sation action can be traced to the dissatisfaction with and
criticism of the present rule. The commentary to the bill cor-
rectly notes that there has been "much critical comment and
dissatisfaction" engendered by Rule 23(b)(3)."1 A growing con-
sensus, however, is that the courts have been or are in the
process of working out many of the initial management
problems as experience with the rule grows. 2 Indeed, Justice
Benjamin Kaplan of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, the reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
that drafted the 1966 revision, forecast that it would probably
take at least a full generation before the problems and
mechanics of the rule would be developed sufficiently and un-
derstood.9 Moreover, the Department of Justice has made no
effort to distinguish the difficulties attributable to Rule 23
from those inherent in all large, complex litigation cases. 4
Thus, although the cry for reform may have a superficial ap-
peal, the present class action procedures may not be the root
of the problem.
Certain aspects of the proposal, such as the substitution
of specific numbers in place of the more general "numerosity"
requirement, may in fact simplify class action certification.
The introduction of substantial new terminology, however,
may lead to yet new rounds of litigation. The deletion of cer-
tain current prerequisites may result in the certification of
more complex and less cohesive class actions. Thus, the at-
tempts at simplifying certification may result in even greater
delay and more management problems in class litigation.
For example, the bill eliminates the present requirement
that common questions "predominate" over other issues. The
91 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 1.
92 Senate Class Action Hearings, supra note 3, at 117; Miller, Of Frankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the Class Action Problem, 92
HARV. L. REv. 664, 666, 680 (1979).
93 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 52
(1967) (quoting then Professor Kaplan).
9" Senate Class Action Hearings, supra note 3, at 122; Miller, supra note 92, at
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rationale advanced for the deletion is the courts' inability to
articulate a practical test of predominance and the notion
that, "if applied literally, predominance would prevent all
Rule 23(b)(3) damage actions because, by their nature, these
actions always involve many different impact and damage is-
sues." 95 Although courts have been troubled in developing a
practical standard of predominance, they have interpreted the
requirement so that class actions may proceed even where
separate trials of damages or other issues are necessary.96 As
one well-known commentator has observed:
One dominant pattern has emerged from the class action de-
cisions under 23(b)(3). Courts have repeatedly focused on
the liability issue, in contrast to individual right to recover
or amount of individual damages; and if they found that lia-
bility issues were common to the class, have held that those
issues predominated over any potential individual issues for
23(b)(3) purposes.'7
Indeed, the Justice Department's own comments on the
original (December 1977) class action draft proposal recog-
nized that, with the exception of plaintiffs' attorneys, an over-
whelming majority of all private practitioners, legal scholars
and federal appellate and district court judges favored ex-
tending the present predominance requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) to Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions.9 8
Moreover, the introduction of a new "substantial common
question" requirement provides no more assurance of an ob-
jective standard than does the "predominance" requirement
with its developed judicial gloss. The new requirement will
"1 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 27.
96 See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
97 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS: A MANUAL FOR GROUP LITIGATION
AT FEDERAL AND STATE LEVELS § 1155 (1977).
'8 OFFICE OF IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRAFT STATUTE AND COMMENTARY at 53 (Dec. 1, 1977); RULE
23 SUBCOMM., ADVISORY Comm. ON CIVIL RULES, CLASS ACTION QUESTIONNAIRE RE-
SPONSES (1977). See also AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 1, 7-10, 25-28 (1972); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note
80, at 1626.
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likely result in extensive briefing and discovery efforts by par-
ties attempting to persuade the court that there is or is not a
substantial common question. Given the lack of judicial inter-
pretation, litigation will be stimulated.
Another deletion from the present rule is the requirement
that the court consider whether a class action is superior to
other available methods for adjudicating the controversy.
Thus, even if an alternative method of adjudication, such as a
"test case," were more efficient and appropriate, the court
could not refuse to certify the class action solely on the
ground of the other method's superiority. The deletion of this
requirement would needlessly diminish judicial flexibility and,
when combined with the elimination of the predominance re-
quirement, would result in the certification of unmanageable
cases that are inappropriate for class action treatment.
The bill would also delete the requirement of typicality of
claims and defenses on the ground that this "requirement has
served in the past only as a duplicative standing test."99 Al-
though the requirement somewhat overlaps both the common
question and the adequate representation requirements, 100
conflicts of interest among class members are more apt to
arise if the requirement is deleted.
2. Notice in Class Compensatory Actions
The proposed bill directs the court at or immediately af-
ter the preliminary hearing to "determine whether some or all
other injured persons will be excluded from or included in the
class only if they so request by a specified date."101 The court
must thereafter give notice "reasonably necessary to assure
adequacy of representation of all persons included in the class
and fairness to all such persons."102 Thus, contrary to the
9 BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 29.
100 The essential policy behind Rule 23(a)(3) is the same as that behind Rule
23(a)(4): "That the representatives ought to be squarely aligned in interest with the
represented group." Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 387 n.120
(1967).
101 H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 101, § 3022(d) (1981).
102 Id. at § 3022(e)(2).
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public action, some form of prejudgment notice would be re-
quired in the class compensatory action. The requirement,
however, is a watered-down version of present Rule 23(c)(2),
which requires "the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort."1 3
The original drafters of Rule 23 viewed individual notice
to all identifiable class members as constitutionally re-
quired.10 4 After the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin,0 5 it is unclear whether the bill's relaxed no-
tice requirements could pass constitutional muster. Even the
bill commentary acknowledges that individual notice may
sometimes be justified.0 " In any event, the introduction of the
new notice requirement could certainly stimulate further
litigation.
10 7
In the case of post-judgment notice, the defendant must
bear both the cost of identifying persons likely to have been
injured by his conduct and the cost of giving notice to them of
the finding of liability. Although the imposition of such costs
on defendants has been upheld by the Third Circuit,108 the
costs could be enormous. The court has no discretion or flex-
ibility to adjust the notice requirement to fit the facts and
circumstances of a particular case. In contrast to the pre-judg-
ment notice, the defendant would be statutorily required to
give individual notice to those who can be identified, regard-
less of the potential cost.
103 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
304 Rule 23 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 107 (1966). But see Com-
ment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class Ac-
tions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217, 1224-41 (1975).
105 417 U.S. 156 (1976).
1'l BILL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 49.
107 Interestingly, the Eisen case continued for eight years before the Supreme
Court finally decided the issue. 417 U.S. at 159.
"' The Justice Department cites Samuels v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d
991, 994, 999 (3d Cir. 1976) to support the position that such cost shifting after a
determination of liability is constitutional. The department views cost-shifting as
"equivalent to taxing costs against the losing party," citing FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and
therefore, as not unconstitutional. MEMORANDA ON CONSTITUTIONALITY, supra note 66,
at 11-12.
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C. Management Techniques
The bill would also effect a number of procedural modifi-
cations and innovations, applicable to both public and class
compensatory actions, designed to render class actions more
manageable and effective. Several of these modifications ap-
pear well-grounded and could substantially enhance the effec-
tiveness of class actions with minimal concomitant disadvan-
tage. For example, the requirement of a preliminary hearing
at an early stage in the public action is a useful innovation
that would enhance the court's ability to screen out frivolous
suits brought by plaintiffs interested in achieving a quick set-
tlement or harassing the defendant. Moreover, the court's or-
der entered at the conclusion of the hearing would define the
scope of the action, thereby affording the parties some insight
into the defendant's potential liability and the res judicata ef-
fect of a judgment. If, at the hearing, the court decided to
dismiss the action as a public or class compensatory action,
the plaintiff could immediately appeal the court's decision,
thereby ensuring a speedy and final determination on the cer-
tification issue. Similarly, the modifications limiting discovery
and motions prior to the preliminary hearing should reduce
the inordinate delays caused by protracted discovery disputes
and pre-certification motions. The parties, however, would
still be furnished a sufficient opportunity to gather informa-
tion necessary to support their respective positions at the pre-
liminary hearing.
III. REACTION TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PROPOSAL
Reaction to the Justice Department proposal has been
mixed. During the congressional hearings, several individuals
testified in strong support of the proposal. 10° Although oppo-
109 See, e.g., Senate Class Action Hearings, supra note 3. (Statements of Attor-
ney General Griffin Bell, Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Meador, Professor
G.W. Foster, Jr., Hon. John P. Fullam, Hon. Sam C. Pointer and Kenneth R. Reed).
See Berry, supra note 54, at 299 for an article strongly supporting the legislation.
Stephen Berry was serving with the Office of Improvements in the Administration of
Justice at the time he wrote the article.
A commentator in the Kentucky Law Journal gave a more guarded favorable
reaction to the proposed legislation. See Comment, supra note 11, at 216.
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nents to the bill also testified,"' criticism prior to this article
has not been publicized widely. Opposition has been wide-
spread, however, and those opposing the bill include a number
of members of sections of the American Bar Association and
the American College of Trial Lawyers. These groups were
among those originally invited to comment upon the proposal,
and they did so with vigor. Prior to the bill's introduction in
Congress, significant revisions were made to the discussed
proposal, partly in response to these comments.
The ABA Litigation Section prepared a lengthy report on
Senate Bill 3475. After having been circulated to and reviewed
by other interested sections, this report was presented to the
ABA House of Delegates at its mid-winter 1979 meeting in
Atlanta."' With the support of those sections, the ABA
adopted the Litigation Section's report in opposition to the
Department of Justice proposal. The following resolution was
passed:
Litigation (Report No. 125)
A substitute recommendation, proposed by the Board of
Governors and agreed to by the Section, was approved by
voice vote. The substitute reads:
Be It Resolved, That the American Bar Association .is
opposed to the enactment of any class action legisfa-
tion which would contain the following features: trans-
fer to the United States Department of Justice control
over private class litigation; transform the class action
from a compensatory to a punitive device; adversely af-
fect substantive rights of litigants by eliminating re-
quirements for proof of damages and restricting the
right to receive damages; relax or eliminate important
procedural rights, such as the right of absentees to re-
ceive notice and participate, now provided in Rule 23
of the Rules of Federal Procedure; and substantially
increase the burdens of an already overburdened fed-
eral judiciary, without concomitant benefit. Resolved,
110 See, e.g., Senate Class Action Hearings, supra note 3. (Statements of William
Simon, Philip A. Lacovara on behalf of the Business Roundtable and National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, Professor Arthur R. Miller, Paul M. Bernstein, J. Vernon
Patrick, Jr.).
"' This article draws upon the Section of Litigation's report in many areas.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
That the American Bar Association stands ready to as-
sist and cooperate with the Department of Justice to
address the foregoing.
12
Because the ABA hopes to assist and cooperate in ad-
dressing the problems associated with class actions and be-
cause the Litigation Section agrees with some of the premises
underlying the Justice Department proposal, the section re-
cently has formed a committee to study the need for class ac-
tion reform and, perhaps, to draft its own reform proposal.
Although it is too early to predict the shape of any proposal
that the committee may make, clearly the more meritorious
suggestions of the Department of Justice will be seriously con-
sidered. A variety of innovative, and perhaps controversial,
ideas for dealing with class actions will possibly surface. Thus,
regardless of the fate of the Justice Department proposal as
embodied in House Bill 13, the debate with respect to class
action reform will clearly continue, and am endments to Rule
23(b)(3), whether major or minor, will likely emerge at some
point in the future.
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